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Stephen C. Veltri*
Should Foreign Exchange Be "Foreign"
to Article Two of the Uniform
Commercial Code?
Introduction
In 1988, the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial
Code commissioned a study group to recommend revisions to the center-
piece of the Code-Article 2 on sales.' The group issued a report that
identified recurring problems with the existing Article and proposed a
number of changes. The group noted, among other concerns, that courts
have experienced some difficulty in defining the scope of Article 2.2
The existing statutory language has not given the courts much gui-
dance. Section 2-102 states simply: "Unless the context otherwise
requires, [Article 2] applies to transactions in goods."3 Yet, the Code does
not define "transaction" and leaves obscure the phrase: "unless the con-
text otherwise requires."4 Other sections of the Code further confuse the
issue. For example, some sections seem to limit their reach exclusively to
sales, 5 leaving courts in doubt as to whether these sections apply to other
forms of exchange such as franchising or licensing arrangements. 6 Con-
versely, other sections bearing on the scope of Article 2 appear to have an
almost limitless reach. For example, courts have applied the Code's deft-
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1. PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, PEB STUDY
GROUP UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 2 PRELIMINARY REPORT (1990) [hereinafter
STUDY GROUP REPORT]. Article 2 was drafted by Karl Llewellyn, the chief reporter of the
Uniform Commercial Code. In many respects the Code reflects his vision. SeeWILuAM
TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIsT MOVEMENT 270-340 (1973); Soia Ment-
schikoff, Reflections of a Drafter, 43 OHIO ST. LJ. 537 (1982); William A. Schnader, A Short
History of the Preparation and Enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 U. MIAMI L. REv.
1, 4 (1967).
2. STUDY GROUP REPORT, supra note 1, at 37-44.
3. U.C.C. § 2-102 (1993).
4. STUDY GROUP REPORT, supra note 1, at 40.
5. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-312, 2-314 (1993).
6. See, e.g., Vigano v. Wylain, Inc., 633 F.2d 522, 525-26 (8th Cir. 1980) (refusing to
apply Article 2 to a distributorship agreement under Missouri law); Zapatha v. Dairy
Mart, Inc., 408 N.E.2d 1370, 1375 (Mass. 1980) (applying Article 2 to a franchise
agreement).
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nition of the term "goods" to reach transactions involving computer
software, 7 personal services,8 and, as we shall see, foreign currency
exchange.9
This confusion led the study group to recommend that the proposed
Article 2 revisions should help to clarify the Article's scope.10 The group
could not agree, however, on just how far to expand or constrict Article 2's
reach. Some members of the group favored narrowing the Article's scope,
while others thought a revised Code should reach well beyond the stan-
dard sale of goods." The drafting committee appointed to prepare a
revised Article 2 seems to favor the latter approach. As of this writing, the
committee appears to envision a revised article that sets forth core provi-
sions in part 1 applicable to all sorts of contracts, followed by other parts
dealing with particular transactions such as software and even services. 1
2
The committee has likened the approach to a wheel, with the core provi-
sions as its "hub" and the transaction specific provisions as its "spokes."
13
This article reviews a line of cases that suggests limits to the expansion
of Article 2. The cases involve foreign exchange transactions: the trading
of bank balances denominated in one national currency for those denomi-
nated in another. Part I of this article describes the conduct of foreign
exchange and its importance in international trade. Part II criticizes judi-
cial decisions that have applied Article 2 to these transactions. Article 2 is
criticized as a poor vehicle for regulating these exchanges. The Article
was not drafted with foreign exchange in mind, and has rules of form-
such as a statute of frauds-that create problems for foreign exchange
transactions. Moreover, the Article has remedies-such as the right of a
seller to reclaim goods-that minimize the importance of finality, a policy
of central importance to foreign exchange. Part III of this article suggests
how a revised Article 2 should define its scope.
This Article concludes that Article 2 should narrowly confine its scope
to the sale of goods, but that it should also contain an expansion clause
that would allow courts to apply its provisions by analogy to other transac-
tions. The commentary should direct a court faced with a scope question
7. E.g., RRX Indus., Inc. v. Lab-Con, Inc., 772 F.2d 543, 546-47 (9th Cir. 1985);
Chaflos Sys., Inc. v. National Cash Register Corp., 479 F. Supp. 738 (D.N.J. 1979), affd,
635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980). Seegenerally Andrew Rodau, Computer Software Contracts: A
Review of the Caselaw, 21 AKRON L. REv. 45 (1987).
8. E.g., Newmark v. Gimbel's Inc., 258 A.2d 697, 701 (N.J. 1969) (applying the
U.C.C. to a transaction involving a beautician's services); Vitromar Piece Dye Works v.
Lawrence of London, Ltd., 256 N.E.2d 135, 138 (Ill. App. Ct. 1969) (applying Article 2
to a contract to waterproof silk). See generally Crystal L. Miller, Note, The Goods/Services
Dichotomy and the U. C. C.: Unweaving the Tangled Web, 59 NoTRE DAME L.Rzv. 717 (1984).
9. See infra notes 147-76 and accompanying text.
10. STUDY GROUP REPORT, supra note 1, at 40.
11. Id. at 41-42.
12. Amelia H. Boss & Stephen C. Veltri, Introduction to the Uniform Commercial Code
Survey: A Plea for Cooperation, 48 Bus. LAw. 1583, 1586-87 (1993); Raymond Nimmer et
al., License Contracts Under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code: A Proposal, 19 RUTGERS
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 281, 318-22 (1993).
13. Boss & Veltri, supra note 12, at 1587.
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not to mechanical rules of form, such as whether the transaction involves a
'"sale" or a "good," but to a reasoned analogy. A court should ask whether
it makes commercial sense to apply the substantive rules of Article 2 in the
commercial setting involved in the dispute. Such an approach is consis-
tent with the realistjurisprudence that informs the Code and that is one of
its greatest strengths.
I. Foreign Exchange at the End of the 20th Century
A foreign exchange transaction can consist of the exchange of dollars for
pounds at Heathrow Airport, or the electronic exchange of large bank
balances denominated in different currencies. Although the vacationer's
face-to-face exchange is important, large transactions are far more signifi-
cant. In 1992, the average foreign exchange transaction in the United
States involved $6 million. 14
The scale of foreign exchange activity in 1992 was astonishing. On
the basis of data collected in April 1992, the Bank for International Settle-
ments estimated global net turnover in the world's markets at $880 billion
per day.' 5 The United States' share of this market was $192 billion each
day.16 Estimates of the amounts traded in New York alone range from
forty to sixty times the turnover on the NewYork Stock Exchange.' 7 Obvi-
ously, no market for hard goods-automobiles, washing machines, televi-
sions, or airliners-approaches the size of the foreign exchange market.
The most important segment of the market remains "spot trading,"
which accounts for nearly half of all foreign exchange.' 8 A "spot trade"
occurs when participants in the market agree to exchange currencies
within two business days.19 Parties to an international trade enter the spot
market when it is time to pay for the goods or services for which they have
contracted.20 For example, suppose a shoe store chain in Des Moines
wishes to offer the latest Italian loafers for sale next summer. The Des
Moines retailer contracts in March with an Italian supplier to take delivery
of the shoes and pay for them onJune 1. If the retailer believes the dollar
will be worth more in relation to the lira in June than it is in March, or if
he pays little attention to the foreign exchange dimension of his trade, he
will wait until the last moment to exchange his dollars into lire to pay for
14. BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, CENTRAL BANK SURVEY OF FOREIGN
EXcHANGE MARTr AcrIvrrY IN APRIL 1992, at 25 (1993) [hereinafter CENTRAL BANK
SURVEY].
15. Id. at 5.
16. Id. at 13-14.
17. DiMrrus N. CHORAFAS, TREASURY OPERATIONS AND THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE CHAL-
LENGE: A GUIDE TO RISK MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES FOR THE NEW WORLD MARKETS 78
(1992).
18. CENTRAL. BANK SURVEY, supra note 14, at 16.
19. Id.; see also HEINZ PMEHL & RITA M. RODRIGUEZ, FOREIGN EXCHANGE AND MONEY
MARKETS 443 (1983).
20. For a general discussion of foreign exchange transactions and their role in for-
eign trade, see Michael L. Manire, Note, Foreign Exchange Sales and the Law of Contracts:
A Casefor Analogy to the Uniform Commercial Code, 35 VAND. L. REv. 1173 (1982).
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the shoes. His bank or the seller's bank may actually make the exchange,
but if it occurs within two business days it is considered a spot trade.
In an international sale, use of a spot trade carries a risk. In our
example, the retailer is exposed to the risk that the lira may appreciate in
relation to the dollar before he pays for the shoes. In a two to three
month period, value of the lira to the dollar may fluctuate by several per-
centage points. 2 1 Fluctuation of even a few points can cause a significant
loss in a large transaction. In the example above, the decline in the dollar
from the end of March to June 1993, would have cost the Iowa retailer
roughly $6,000 in a $100,000 order.22 To cover this exposure a trader can
purchase the currency he or she will need in the forward foreign
exchange market.2 3 At the time the Iowa retailer enters into the contract
for the Italian shoes, or at any time before she takes delivery, she may wish
to buy lire on the forward market for June 1. She thus insures against
fluctuation and fixes the cost of the currency exchange she must make to
buy the Italian shoes.
Forward transactions of the kind just described comprise what is
known as the outright forward market.24 It includes any trade that calls
for the exchange of currencies outside of two business days. 25 Most for-
ward trades, however, have maturities that are not much longer than two
days. Nearly two-thirds of all foreign exchanges involve exchanges of cur-
rency within a week. 26 Only one percent of the total transactions have
maturities of over a year.2 7 The outright forward market is used heavily by
merchants engaged in international trade to cover their exposure in inter-
national sales just like the shoe retailer in the example above. 28 This seg-
ment of the foreign exchange market has experienced considerable
growth in recent years. 29
In addition to the outright forward market, futures transactions can
involve swaps.3 0 In a swap, the two parties to the transaction agree to
exchange currencies at an agreed rate on a given date.3 ' At a later date
they reverse the transaction, typically at a different rate.3 2 One trader sells
21. For example, the dollar declined approximately six percent in relation to the
lira between April I andJune 1, 1993. Compare Key Currency Cross Rates, WALL ST.J., Apr.
2, 1993, at C13 (listing the lira at 1586 to the dollar) with Key Currency Cross Rates, WALL
ST. J., June 2, 1993, at C15 (listing the lira at 1465 to the dollar).
22. Id.
23. R1EHL & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 19, at 334. A "forward market" is defined as a
"market in which foreign currency, and some money market instruments, are traded
for future delivery." Id. at 435.
24. CENTRAi- BANK SURVEY, supra note 14, at 18-19.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 19.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. "Growth has been rapid, with gross transactions expanding by 60% between
April 1989 and April 1992 in the twelve countries reporting such data in these two
years." Id.
30. Id. at 18.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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the currency he or she had previously purchased, while the other trader
buys the currency he or she had earlier sold.3 3 A swap can involve a spot
trade against a forward trade or two forward trades.3 4 A trader can use the
swap market to minimize financial risk.35 To illustrate with the example
above, the Iowa retailer has entered into an outright forward contract to
buy lire on June 1. The risk of depreciation in the lira has now passed to
the bank that has agreed to sell the lire. If the bank waits until June 1 to
buy the lire on the "spot" market, it loses if the lira declines in value in
relation to the dollar. The bank, however, can cover its exposure caused
by agreeing to the forward sale of lire by agreeing to a forward purchase of
lire. Such a swap, involving the bank and two other parties, is called an
engineered swap.36 Swaps are frequently conducted bilaterally, between
two traders alone, and are then called pure swaps.37 Pure swaps enable
dealers active in the foreign exchange markets to position themselves for
what they perceive to be the direction of the market.3 8 For example, a
trader who thinks the dollar will appreciate in relation to the lira will swap
by buying dollars on the spot market and simultaneously agreeing to sell
the dollars forward. If that dealer's perception of the direction of the mar-
ket changes, he can close his exposed position with another swap.3 9 Arbi-
tragers also employ pure swaps to take advantage of different rates in
different markets. 40
Foreign exchange swaps are the fastest growing segment of the mar-
ket.4 ' Banks and investment firms are the most active participants in the
swap market.42 Most of their swaps are international, that is, they are
made with a dealer in another country.43 Swaps for commercial firms or
"customers" made up only fourteen percent of the market in 1992, and
these trades were overwhelmingly domestic. 44 Continued growth in the
swap market can be expected in an era, such as ours, when the dollar
33. See RIEHL & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 19, at 104; Barry W. Taylor, Currency Swaps,
and Related Exchange Transactions, in INTEREsT RATE AND CURENcy SWAPS 245 (PLI Cor-
porate Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 505, 1985).
34. See CHORAFAS, supra note 17, at 93-94.
35. CENTRAL BANK SURVEY, supra note 14, at 19.
36. RIEHL & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 19, at 105-06.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. The market continues to develop new and more sophisticated transactions.
Most of these transactions-interest rate swaps, caps, floors, and collars-are beyond
the scope of this article. These other transactions, however, could also be subjected to
regulation by the Uniform Commercial Code under the rationale of the cases discussed
infra notes 147-76 and accompanying text. For an excellent summary description of the
market, see Daniel P. Cunningham et al., Interest Rate and Currency Swaps and Related
Transactions, in SwAPs AND OTHER DERIVATIVES IN 1993, at 511, 515-21 (PLI Corporate
Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. B-815, 1993). For a description of arbi-
trage in foreign exchange, see Miller v. Wells Fargo Bank Int'l, 540 F.2d 548 (2d Cir.
1976).
41. CENTRAL BANK SURVEY; supra note 14, at 19.
42. Id. at 20.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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floats relatively freely against the yen and the European currencies. 45
Ninety-five percent of all swaps include the dollar.4 6 Forty-four percent of
all swaps are between the dollar and the Japanese yen or the dollar and
the German mark.47 With free floating exchange rates, market activity by
dealers helps keep the dollar in equilibrium with other leading
currencies.48
Foreign exchange trades are conducted by telephone, telex, and
other electronic means. In recent years, banks and other dealers have
invested millions of dollars in foreign exchange centers that incorporate
state of the art technology in telecommunications, computers, and systems
software. 49 From a personal computer station in one of these centers, a
dealer can receive up-to-date market rate information and the dealer's
own position in various currencies. 50 The dealer can also execute trades
from the same station.51 Customers of banks that have established such a
center can access it and participate in a twenty-four-hour market.5 2 This
technology allows for a trading volume undreamed of only a few years ago.
Reuters Ltd., the leading supplier of currency trading systems, recently
reported that in just one week in 1992, 1.4 million "electronic conversa-
tions" took place on its network.53 Dealers have increasingly relied on
automated trading systems. In 1992, automated trading systems facilitated
nearly one-third of the transactions conducted by American firms.54
Foreign exchange transactions are generally settled by electronic
45. See PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WiLLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMIcs 714 (14th ed.
1992). Flexible, or "floating," exchange rates between countries exist when "the
exchange rates are predominantly determined by private market forces (i.e., by supply
and demand) without government's setting and maintaining a particular pattern of
exchange rates." Id. at 737.
46. CENTRAL BANK SURVEY, supra note 14, at 20.
47. Id.
48. SAMUELSON & NoRDHAus, supra note 45, at 714. At the beginning of this cen-
tury, the major currencies were redeemable in gold. Id. at 712. Currencies under the
gold standard could be exchanged according to their gold value. Id. At the Bretton
Woods conference held near the end of World War II, the major industrial nations
agreed to regulate exchange rates by fixing values in relation to the United States dollar
as well as gold. Id. at 715. During the Nixon Administration the United States aban-
doned the Bretton Woods system, and the dollar has floated relatively freely against the
yen and the European currencies ever since. See id. at 717. By the summer of 1993,
trading in the European currencies reached the point where the managed system of
exchange among those currencies, similar to Bretton Woods, no longer seemed to
work. The European countries adjusted the system to allow greater fluctuation from
the exchange rates pegged for each currency. See To Fix orFoat Exchange Rates, ECONO-
MIST, Aug. 7, 1993, at 70.
49. See, e.g., Bank-of-A meica-3; Unveils New Foreign Exchange Trading Center in Los Ange-
les, Bus. WiRE, Oct. 13, 1983, available in LEXIS, Compny Library, Bwire File.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Paula Dwyer et al., Reuters Sees a Blip on the Screen, Bus. WK,., Oct. 12, 1992, at 62.
That week's volume was "40% more than its average volume." Id. The increased vol-
ume was presumably triggered by the United Kingsom's inability to stay within the
European Exchange Rate mechanism. Id.
54. CENTRAL BANK SURVEY, supra note 14, at 24.
Vol 27
1994 Foreign Exchange and the U.C.C.
funds transfers. 55 Returning to the example above, assume the Iowa
retailer purchased lire on the spot market through his bank. The Iowa
bank will exchange a dollar denominated bank balance for one denomi-
nated in lire. The retailer might then instruct his bank to wire these funds
to the Italian bank that holds the account of the shoe manufacturer.
There may be one or more banks that act as intermediaries between the
American and Italian banks in making the transfer.5 6 By utilizing elec-
tronic funds transfers, the Iowa retailer and his bank will settle the
retailer's obligation and the necessary foreign exchange quite quickly.
In the United States, Article 4A of the Uniform Commercial Code
governs electronic funds transfers between banks. The National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Law
Institute promulgated Article 4A in 1989. 57 Since then, forty-eight states
and the District of Columbia have adopted the Article.58 The Federal
Reserve wire transfer system (Fedwire) and the New York Clearing House
Interbank Payments Systems (CHIPS) have also incorporated provisions of
Article 4A in their rules.5 9 These systems figure prominently in foreign
exchange transactions.60
In addition to the foreign exchange transactions previously described,
currency futures and options are also traded on exchanges such as the
International Monetary Market in Chicago and the London International
Financial Futures Exchange. 61 In a futures contract, the buyer agrees to
purchase a given currency at a given maturity longer than two days.
62
With an option, the buyer has the right either to purchase or to sell the
given currency at a time and price specified in the contract. 63 Exchange
traded futures and options are in standardized contracts, as opposed to
the negotiated bargains that make up forward contracts. 64 They are set-
tled over the exchange and are thus anonymous. The exchange stands
between any buyer and seller.65 More currency options are traded over-
the-counter than on organized exchanges. 66 Like swaps, they can be used
to minimize financial risks. Not surprisingly, therefore, options exchang-
ing the dollar for the yen or the German mark dominate the over-the-
55. Id.
56. For a general description of an electronic funds transfer, see UNiF. COMMERCIAL
CODE 2B U.L.A. Art. 4A, Prefatory Note (1991).
57. UNIF. COMMERCIAL CODE 2B U.LA Art. 4A, Historical Notes (1991).
58. Vermont adopted Article 4A on May 18, 1994. 1994 Vt. Laws 158. For a list of
the other forty-seven states who have adopted the article, see UNIF. COMMERCIAL CODE
2B U.L.A. Art. 4A, Prefatory Note (Supp. 1994).
59. Robert G. Ballen et al., Commercial Paper, Bank Deposits and Collections, and Other
Payment Systems, 46 Bus. LAw. 1521, 1522 (1991).
60. CHORAFAS, supra note 17, at 78-79.
61. Id. at 198-201, 214-21; CENTRAL BANK SURVEY, supra note 14, at 20-23.
62. CENTRAL BANK SURVEY, supra note 14, at 20.
63. Id. at 22.
64. Id. at 20.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 23.
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counter options market.67
Foreign exchange activity and the participating banks and dealers are
subject to various regulations. All persons engaged in foreign exchange
must comply with federal reporting requirements. 68 The banks engaged
in foreign exchange must comply with capital adequacy guidelines
promulgated by the Federal Reserve Board, the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. These guidelines
were established by a twelve-nation accord reached in Basel, Switzerland in
1988.69 Dealers who trade in currencies belong to self-governing bodies
like the International Forex Association, the International Swap Dealers
Association, and the British Bankers Association. These organizations
have developed practice codes and standard agreements to govern foreign
exchange transactions.7 ° The Foreign Exchange Committee of the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of New York has also promulgated trading practice
guidelines and model forms. 7 1
The macroeconomic effects of foreign exchange activity are regulated
by the central banks of the nations of the world. 72 When the United States
desires to intervene in the foreign exchange market, it does so through
the foreign exchange desk of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 73 An
example of this activity occurred in May 1994, when the United States,
through the Exchange Stabilization Fund of the National Treasury,
engaged in coordinated purchases of dollars with the central banks of six-
teen nations in order to stabilize exchange rates.74 Decisions of this kind
are generally made at the highest level of government.75
To summarize, foreign exchange is characterized today by high vol-
ume trading of large bank balances. Most exchange transactions, whether
on the spot or forward market, have very short maturities. The trading is
highly automated and is conducted by the most advanced means of elec-
tronic communication. This advanced technology facilitates a very high
volume of trading on a twenty-four-hour market. Dealers and others in
the market generally settle their accounts by electronic funds transfers.
Currency options and futures are traded both on exchanges and over the
counter. Options and futures can operate like traditional foreign
exchange trades in hedging against financial risks in foreign trade. Par-
ticipants in the foreign exchange market are subject to varying degrees of
federal regulation. The Federal Reserve and the United States Treasury
67. Id.
68. See 31 C.F.R. pt. 128 (1993).
69. Cunningham et al., supra note 40, at 511, 536.
70. Id. at 525.
71. THE FOREIGN EXcHANGE COMMrrrEE, ANNUAL REPORT 1991, at 5, 26-33, 36-55
(1990).
72. Thomas L. Friedman, 16 Nations Aid U.S. in Backing Value of Dollar, N.Y. TIMES,
May 5, 1994, at Al.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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will occasionally intervene in the foreign exchange market to stabilize
rates.
It seems odd that courts would look to Article 2 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code to resolve disputes involving a foreign exchange trade. Arti-
cle 2, after all, was drafted in the 1940s to govern sales of hard goods,7 6 yet
the courts have rather unreflectively applied its provisions in cases involv-
ing foreign exchange.
II. Article 2 Applied To Foreign Exchange Transactions
The text of Article 2 and its accompanying commentary are deceptively
simple. The "Article applies to transactions in goods."77 "Goods" are
defined as "all things... which are moveable at the time of identification
to the contract... other than the money in which the price is to be paid,
investment securities (Article 8) and things in action."7 8
The official comments to the definition of "goods" sheds some light
on the drafters' exclusion of "money in which the price is to be paid":
The exclusion of "money in which the price is to be paid" from the
definition of goods does not mean that foreign currency which is included
in the definition of money may not be the subject of a sales transaction.
Goods is intended to cover the sale of money when money is being treated
as a commodity but not to include it when money is the medium of
payment.79
The exclusion of things or choses in action from the definition of "goods,"
although not explained by the drafters, dates back to the earliest drafts of
the Code.80 The drafters simply adopted the language employed by the
Uniform Sales Act, the predecessor to Article 2, which defined "goods" to
"include all chattels personal other than things in action and money."
8 1
The Sales Act's definition was itself lifted from the British Sale of Goods
Act of 1894.82 Since the exclusion of things or choses in action is over a
hundred years old, the words should be read in light of their common law
meaning. At common law, a thing or chose in action was a right to per-
sonal property that the owner does not possess.83 The right to recover a
76. See 1 EUzABETH S. KELLY, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE DRArrs 177, 322 (1984)
[hereinafter I KELLY].
77. U.C.C. § 2-102 (1993).
78. U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (1993).
79. U.C.C. § 2-105 official cmt. 1 (1993).
80. See UNIFORM REvIsED SALES ACT, PROPOSED FINAL DRAPT No. 1, reprinted in 2
ELIZABETH S. KEL.Y, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE DarAs 16, 106 (1984) [hereinafter 2
KELLY]; REPORT Am SECOND DRAFT, THE REVISED UNIFORM SALES Aar, reprinted in 1
KELLY, supra note 76, at 322; DRAFT OF A UNIFORM SALES ACr REVISED CoPY OF EARLIER
PORTION, repinted in 1 KELLY, supra note 76, at 262.
81. UNIF. SALES ACT § 76.
82. The Sale of Goods Act, 56 & 57 Vict., ch. 71, § 62(1) (1894) stated "goods
include all chattels personal other than things in action and money, and in Scotland all
corporeal movables except money."
83. BL.cK's LAw DICTIONARY 241 (6th ed. 1990).
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debt, for example, is a chose in action.8 4 Courts have also universally char-
acterized a bank balance or credit as a thing or chose in action. 85
In determining the applicability of Article 2, the issue then is whether
the typical foreign exchange transaction, involving the exchange of a bank
balance denominated in one currency for a balance denominated in
another, should be characterized as a contract for a commodity or for a
chose in action. If it is a contract for a commodity, the official comment
to section 2-10586 strongly supports the argument that the transaction lies
within Article 2. If the transaction is, however, primarily an exchange of
credits on a bank's books, Article 2's exclusion of things in action seems to
apply.
Because the language of the Code is so similar to the British and Uni-
form Sales Acts, efforts to interpret these statutes are instructive. No court
has ever considered whether foreign exchange transactions fall within the
British Sale of Goods Act. The leading British treatise on sales law sug-
gests, however, that a foreign exchange transaction involves the transfer of
a chose in action.87 Relying on eighteenth century criminal cases,88 the
treatise opines that foreign exchange transactions are not within the Brit-
ish Sales Act.8 9
In contrast to the British experience, a number of foreign exchange
cases arose under the Uniform Sales Act. The earliest of these decisions
presented the issue of whether a foreign exchange contract was enforcea-
ble under the Act's Statute of Frauds.90 Unfortunately, while the defini-
tion of "goods" under the Sales Act excluded things in action,9 1 the
Statute of Frauds does not.92 Since the Statute of Frauds in the Sales Act
applies to both sales of goods and things in action,93 courts issuing these
early decisions did not need to draw a sharp distinction between the two.
The decisions show, however, that courts tended to regard the obligation
84. Id.
85. 10 AM. JUR. 2D Banks §.338 (1963).
86. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
87. BENJAMIN'S SALE OF GOODS 76 (A.G. Guest ed., 1st ed. 1974).
88. Rex v. Leigh, 168 Eng. Rep. 129 (1764) (foreign money is not "goods, wares or
merchandise" within the meaning of a criminal statute).
89. See BENJAMIN'S SALE OF GOODS, supra note 87, at 76 n.59. Williston's discussion
of the issue centers on Equitable Trust Co. v. Keene, 183 N.Y.S. 699 (Sup. Ct. 1920),
rev'd 133 N.E. 894 (N.Y. 1922), discussed infra at notes 95-113. Williston also mentions
that the Roman Law distinguished between a sale and an exchange or barter. 1 SAMUEL
WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON SALES § 66b, 168 (rev. ed. 1948). The Code does not draw
this distinction. Any transaction that passes title is a sale. U.C.C. § 2-106 (1993).
90. Reisfeld v.Jacobs, 176 N.Y.S. 223 (Sup. Ct. 1919); Equitable Trust Co. v. Keene,
183 N.Y.S. at 700.
91. UNiF. SALES Act § 76.
92. UNIF. SALES Acr § 4 ("A contract to sell or a sale of any goods or choses in
action of the value of five hundred dollars or upward shall not be enforceable by action
... unless some note or memorandum in writing of the contract be signed by the party
to be charged").
93. Id. The Uniform Commercial Code contains a statute of frauds for things in
action as well. The provision is set forth in the General Provisions of the Code, Article
One. U.C.C. § 1-206 (1993).
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arising from a foreign exchange transaction as a chose in action. 94
In a leading early case, Equitable Trust Co. v. Keene,95 a dealer breached
a forward contract to buy English pounds for dollars from an American
bank.96 When the bank sued, the dealer demurred to the complaint, rais-
ing the Statute of Frauds defense.9 7 Consistent with the common practice
for foreign exchange transactions, the parties made no written record of
their bargain.98 Counsel for the bank argued that no writing was neces-
sary; the forward contract was an executory agreement to extend credit
and thus lay outside the Sales Act's Statute of Frauds.99 The trial court
dismissed the argument, noting that "'credit' made available by one per-
son upon himself for a commodity is merely a circumlocution for a sale or
a contract to sell the article for future delivery."' 00 The trial court refused
to enforce the parties' agreement, because it found the contract was one
for the future delivery of either a commodity or a chose in action and was
therefore covered by the Sales Act's Statute of Frauds. 10 1
The NewYork Court of Appeals reversed the trial court in an opinion
featuring an odd line of legal reasoning but a healthy respect for commer-
cial practice. The opinion initially states the court's awareness of the
effect of its decision on foreign exchange operations.10 2 The court noted
that both parties agreed foreign exchange transactions were commonly
conducted by "word of mouth,"10 3 and that "a decision holding that an
agreement for any such transfer must be evidenced by written memoran-
dum" would produce "much inconvenience." 10 4 The court characterized
the legal issue of whether the exchange fell within the Statute of Frauds as
a "technical question"10 5 and "a mere matter of nomenclature." 0 6 In giv-
ing the complaint a "natural interpretation" to avoid "technicalities and
rather finely spun shades of meaning," 0 7 the court agreed with bank
counsel's characterization of the transaction. The court held that the
exchange involved the future transfer of a bank credit and saw the parties'
bargain as "an agreement to place a certain amount of foreign money to
the credit of the defendant, which necessarily related to the future,
whether measured by the celerity of a cable dispatch or by the delay of a
94. See Reisfeld v.Jacobs, 176 N.Y.S. 223, 234 (Sup. Ct. 1919). The court stated that
a contract for delivery of Russian bank notes involved the sale of a chose in action and
was thus within the Statute of Frauds. Id.
95. 183 N.Y.S. 699 (Sup. Ct 1920), rev'd, 133 N.E. 894 (N.Y. 1922).
96. 183 N.Y.S. at 699.
97. Id. at 699-700. The dealer also raised the interesting defense that the exchange
agreement was an unenforceable wager or gambling contract. Id. at 700. The court
summarily dismissed this claim. Id.
98. 133 N.E. at 894.
99. Id.
100. 183 N.Y.S. at 701.
101. Id.
102. 133 N.E. at 894.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 895.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 894.
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communication by mail."' 0 8 In other words, the court held that, because
the agreement was an executory contract and not a present sale, it need
not be in writing under the Statute of Frauds.
In reaching its decision, the court of appeals cited and praised an
article on foreign exchange by Harlan Stone, then Dean of Columbia Law
School and later Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court. 10 9
Stone's article examines the commercial effect of an agreement to provide
foreign exchange and contrasts that effect with the language commonly
used to describe the exchange. 110 Stone notes that, although often
described in words like "purchase" and "sale," a foreign exchange agree-
ment is in reality an exchange of bank credit. To Stone, the transaction
involved a chose in action:
Although banks do on occasion act as bailees in the physical transmis-
sion of money as in the case of the exportations and importations of gold
made to equalize exchange, this is the exceptional and not the customary
method of effecting transmission. No customer depositing money with a
bank in order to effect payment at a distant point would be justified in
expecting that the banker would physically transmit the money to the point
of payment.
When the transaction involves the banker's undertaking to procure the
payment at a distant point the customer is often spoken of by bankers and
in judicial opinion as having "purchased" exchange, but it is obvious that
the term "purchase" when applied to such a transaction where the banker
does not deliver a bill or draft to the customer is a mere figure of speech
and all that the customer has actually purchased is the banker's undertak-
ing or obligation to effect the payment at a distant point .... Thus the
merchant or traveller who wishes to establish a credit in a foreign country
and secures it by payment of money in dollars to his banker, speaks of hav-
ing purchased pounds sterling, francs, or lire, as the case may be, although
all that in fact or in law he has actually secured is some kind of an obligation
by the banker to secure credit at the distant point payable in pounds,
francs, or lire, as the case may be. Even when the obligation is performed
and the credit is established, he is still only the owner of an obligation or
chose in action, and not of any actual foreign money.1 1'
Williston's treatise on the Law of Sales, the definitive scholarly work on the
Sales Act, criticized the court of appeals' distinction in Keene between a
transaction calling for an immediate performance and one calling for a
future performance. According to Williston, the Sales Act expressly
"applies to contracts to sell as well as sales.""12 Nevertheless, Williston
agreed with the result in Keene. The form of the transaction was critical to
Williston, and because the bank had made a London bank credit available
to the dealer in the dealer's name, Williston thought the transaction
108. Id. at 895.
109. Id.
110. Harlan F. Stone, Some Legal Problems Involved in the Transmission of Funds, 21
COLUM. L. REv. 507 (1921).
111. Id. at 512-14 (citations omitted).
112. 1 WILLISTON, supra note 89, § 67.
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involved neither a good nor a chose in action.' 13 Had the bank credit
been made available to the dealer in the bank's name, however, Williston,
like Stone, would have characterized the transaction as the sale of a chose
in action.
Other New York decisions involving foreign exchange cite the Sales
Act for widely accepted principles of law generally applicable in contract
law. For example, in Meizer v. Zimmerman,1 4 a currency dealer promised
to sell Austrian kronnen to the plaintiff three months forward." 5 The
plaintiff paid the dealer $2,500, but the dealer never performed the con-
tract.116 The United States entered World War I shortly after the parties
entered their agreement, and as a result, there was no ready market for
the kronnen in the United States.117 At trial, the dealer did not contest
his liability for breach of contract. Consequently, the sole issue before the
court was the amount of damages the plaintiff sustained.118 In calculating
and awarding damages, the court relied on the market price of kronnen
quoted shortly before the market collapse." 9
Interestingly, the Melzer court submitted to the jury the question of
whether the contract was for actual currency or for a bank balance payable
by a draft.' 2 0 Had the jury not found that the parties had contracted for
currency, the court apparently would have analyzed the case differently.
The issue of how to categorize the transaction dictated the court's
approach, even though the court understood that the Sales Act's damages
provisions were "mainly declaratory of the common law."' 2 1 The court
applied the general remedial Sales Act principle that a contracting party
should be liable for the market price of a commodity measured at the time
the party has agreed to deliver it.1 2 2 This principle is readily applicable to
a currency exchange, whether one characterizes the transaction as the
transfer of a bank balance or the sale of currency.
In later cases, the New York courts borrowed similar principles from
the Sales Act in deciding disputes that involved foreign exchange. For
instance, the New York Court of Appeals refused to enforce a vague agree-
ment to purchase German marks absent a showing of custom or usage
making the contract more definite.123 In another case, the court of
appeals determined recoverable damages by applying the principle that
"damages suffered by delayed delivery [of Romanian currency] . . . are
measured by the difference between the market value at the stipulated
time of delivery and the market value at the time of the delayed deliv-
113. I.
114. 194 N.Y.S. 222 (Sup. Ct. 1922).
115. Id. at 223.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 224.
118. Id. at 223.
119. Id. at 224-25.
120. See id. at 223.
121. Id. at 224.
122. Id.
123. Zimmerman v. Roessler & Hasslacher Chem. Co., 148 N.E. 659,660 (N.Y. 1925).
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ery."1 2 4 Before citing the Sales Act, the judges deciding both of these
cases characterized the foreign exchange transactions before them as com-
modity sales, even though they were citing general contract principles.
The courts focused on this characterization issue instead of looking at the
appropriateness of applying this statute in a foreign exchange transaction.
This manner of approaching the Code is contrary to that envisioned
by Karl Llewellyn and other drafters of the U.C.C. Llewellyn foresaw
judges reaching results based on "common practice and common
sense"125 rather than definitions or formal rules, an approach evident in
the official comments to the definition of goods. Even though the statu-
tory text excludes investment securities from Article 2, the comment states
that the exclusion was not intended "to prevent the application of a partic-
ular section of this Article by analogy to securities... when the reason of
that section makes such application sensible."1 26 This comment first
appeared in Llewellyn's 1944 draft of revisions to the Uniform Sales Act, a
project that ultimately developed into the Uniform Commercial Code. 127
The comment, as originally drafted, reflects Llewellyn's realist juris-
prudence. Llewellyn thought judges in the late nineteenth century too
often gave statutes a "wooden and literal reading" that frustrated legisla-
tive policies. 128 Llewellyn labelled this era the Formal Period, contrasting
it with an earlier age of jurisprudence, exemplified by judges like Mans-
field, Holt, and Cowen, 129 that Llewellyn referred to as "the Grand Style"
of judicial decision. 130 Llewellyn admired and appreciated judges that
respected commercial practice l3 and judicial decisions that avoided
"enslavement to statutory language" and interpreted a statute like the
Code "in terms of its sense and purpose." 13 2 Llewellyn felt that judges
should feel free to expand the Code's reach if its principles should fit a
transaction that lay outside its scope.' 3 3 On the other hand, he did not
wantjudges to apply a Code provision if its reason did not fit the commer-
cial setting under consideration.13 4 Llewellyn wanted judges to be con-
124. Richard v. American Union Bank, 170 N.E. 532, 535 (N.Y. 1930).
125. 1 KELLY, supra note 76, at 322.
126. U.C.C. § 2-105 cmt. 1 (1993).
127. 2 KELLY, supra note 80, at 106.
128. KARL LLEwELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADMON 374 (1960).
129. See id. at 373-74. The dedication page of The Common Law Tradition illustrates
Llewellyn's great regard for the greatjudges of this earlier age: "To the undying succes-
sion of the Great Commercial Judges whose work across the centuries has given living
body, toughness and inspiration to the Grand Tradition of the Common Law." Id. at
dedication page.
130. Id. at 62-68, 373-74.
131. 1 KELLY, supra note 76, at 297, 299.
132. Id. at 305.
133. Llewellyn makes just this point in his comments to the Code's definition of
goods by referring back to the official comments he drafted for the first section of his
new Code. 2 KELLY, supra note 80, at 94. The Comment to the first section states a
principle should "be extended where its reason and policy apply to a situation outside
the explicit scope of the Code." Id. at 87.
134. "An express provision should be... limited where its reason does not apply."
Id. at 87.
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stantly mindful of the purpose of each section of the Code and the effects
of applying each section in a commercial context,' 3 5 and to respect com-
mercial practice in a manner he felt the predecessor to the Code, the Uni-
form Sales Act, did not strongly encourage.' 3 6 In short, neither Llewellyn
nor any of the other principle drafters of the Code would apply any rule of
Article 2 to a foreign exchange transaction unless it made commercial
sense.
Several features of the judicial decisions under the Sales Act involving
foreign exchange transactions would have appealled to Llewellyn. For
example, he would have applauded the New York Court of Appeals' con-
cern for commercial practice in Equitable Trust Co. v. Keene,'3 7 and would
have appreciated the use of general remedial principles drawn from the
Sales Act in cases like Meizer v. Zimmerman.138 He would not, however,
have had much regard for Williston's approach, which maintained that
the form of a foreign exchange transaction should dictate whether or not
it would lie within the Sales Act.' 3 9 Llewellyn conversely thought transac-
tions similar in commercial effect should be treated alike regardless of
their form.' 40 Llewellyn would also have rejected the manner in which
courts under the Sales Act focused on the difference between the sale of a
chose in action and the sale of a commodity.' 4' As his comment concern-
ing investment securities clarifies, Llewellyn believed courts should
examine whether the reason for a rule fit a given transaction, rather than
focus on the abstract question of how to characterize an exchange.142
Llewellyn's legal realism rejected the mode of legal thinking center-
ing on the categorization of a problem in terms of legal concepts:
[C]ategories and concepts, once formulated and once they have
entered into thought processes, tend to take on an appearance of solidity,
reality, and inherent value which has no foundation in experience. More
than this: although originally formulated on the model of at least some
observed data, they tend, once they have entered into the organization of
thinking, both to suggest the presence of corresponding data when these
data are not in fact present, and to twist any fresh observation of data into
conformity with the terms of the categories. This... is peculiarly trouble-
some in regard to legal concepts, because of the tendency of the crystallized
legal concept to persist after the fact model from which the concept was
once derived has disappeared or changed out of recognition. A simple but
striking instance is the resistance opposed by the "master-servant" concept
135. 1 KELLY, supra note 76, at 309.
136. Id. at 297, 299.
137. 133 N.E. 894 (N.Y. 1922). See supra notes 95-113 and accompanying text.
138. 194 N.Y.S. 222 (Sup. Ct. 1922). See supra notes 114-22 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
140. Llewellyn and Williston disagreed over the Code and had particularly sharp dif-
ferences over the weight the courts should afford to commercial practice. Williston
favored formal rules while Llewellyn would leave much to business usage. See TwINInG,
supra note 1, at 287-89.
141. This is the type of question that the Melercourt submitted to the jury. Seesupra
note 120 and accompanying text.
142. See supra note 126.
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to each readjustment along the lines of a new industrial labor situation.
The counsel of the realistic approach here, then, would be the constant
back-check of the category against the data, to see whether the data are still
present in the form suggested by the category-name. This slows up think-
ing. But it makes for results which mean something when one gets
them.14
3
In his eulogy of Llewellyn, Grant Gilmore recalled Llewellyn's distaste for
legal thinking that centered on what Llewellyn derisively called "lump con-
cepts."144 Llewellyn tried to draft the Uniform Commercial Code to chan-
nel legal analysis away from these concepts and towards fact questions like
trade usage. 145
Faced with a dispute involving foreign exchange, a judge employing
Llewellyn's Grand Style should ask whether the rules of Article 2 fit the
conduct of foreign exchange today, not whether the exchange is better
categorized as one involving goods or a chose in action. The scope sec-
tions of the Uniform Commercial Code, however, did little to change the
courts' approach towards the treatment of foreign exchange under the
Code. While the official comment to the Code's definition of "goods" may
urge a legal realist's approach, the text of the statute draws a categorical
distinction between goods and things in action.1 46
The New York Law Revision Commission, appointed to study the Uni-
form Commercial Code prior to its adoption in New York, voiced concern
that the Code's definition of "goods" would cause problems for foreign
exchange transactions.' 47 The Commission noted that a court could focus
on the language in the official comments to support the view that foreign
exchange transactions are commodity sales within the Article and thus
apply the Code to an exchange.' 48 The Commission cautioned that "the
provisions of the Sales Article hardly seem designed to cope with foreign
exchange transactions; perhaps they would be excluded from the Article
on the ground that they... 'are things in action."''149
As the Law Revision Commission Report makes clear, Llewellyn failed
to resolve the characterization issue. Ironically, the decisions involving
foreign exchange under the Uniform Sales Act were in some respects bet-
ter examples ofjudging in Llewellyn's Grand Style than more recent deci-
sions under the Uniform Commercial Code. These recent decisions have
applied Article 2 to foreign exchange transactions with a surprising lack of
reflection on how banks and others conduct foreign exchange.
The decisions involving foreign exchange since New York's adoption
of the Uniform Commercial Code have all taken the approach that the
143. Karl N. Llewellyn, A RealisticJurisprudence-The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. Ray. 431,
453-54 (1930).
144. Grant Gilmore, In Memoriam: Karl Llewellyn, 71 YALE L.J. 813, 814 (1962).
145. Id.
146. See supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
147. 1 STATE OF NEw YORK LAW REVISION COMMissiON REPORT, STUDY OF THE UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE 361-62 (1955).
148. Id. at 362.
149. Id.
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Law Revision Commission feared. These decisions have held, without
much discussion, that Article 2 applies to currency transactions because
the transactions involve money traded as a commodity, not as a medium of
exchange.' 5 0 The decisions rely on the comment to the Code's definition
of "goods," which the Law Revision Commission predicted would cause
confusion.15 1 The decisions do not consider the alternative interpretation
(favored by the Law Revision Commission and many authorities, including
Harlan Stone, under the prior Sales Act) that foreign exchange involves
the transfer of things in action. More fundamentally, they do not explain
why the Code's rules make commercial sense in a foreign exchange
transaction.
Many arguments can be made in favor of applying the Code to the
issues presented by these cases. For example, in two cases decided in 1991
and 1992, two separate courts applied the Code's parol evidence rule to
confirmation slips generated in currency swaps.' 5 2 The Code allows a
more concise confirmation slip between merchants than the New York
common law.153 Therefore, application of the Code's merchant rules to
currency swaps makes sense. Sophisticated traders, who have developed a
practice of respecting their parol bargains as binding agreements, conduct
these swaps, and by recognizing the binding effect of the slip, the deci-
sions provide more comfort to traders than the New York common law. In
a market as active as the foreign exchange market, finality of the kind
offered by the slip is a paramount concern. 154 The courts issuing these
decisions, however, made no attempt to justify their application of the
Code to these transactions, but instead stated simply: "There seems to be
no question that the U.C.C. applies to foreign currency transaction [s]. '
This type of approach reached the limits of good sense in In re Koreag,
Controle et Revision, S.A.,' 56 a 1992 decision of the U.S. Second Circuit
150. See, e.g., Saboundjian v. Bank Audi (U.S.A.), 556 N.Y.S.2d 258, 261 n.2 (App.
Div. 1990); United Equities Co. v. First Nat'l City Bank, 383 N.Y.S.2d 6 (App. Div. 1976).
151. See Saboundjian, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 261 n.2.
152. Compania Sud-Americana de Vapores, S.A. v. IBJ Schroder Bank & Trust Co.,
785 F. Supp. 411 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (applying New York law); Intershoe, Inc. v. Banker's
Trust Co. 571 N.E.2d 641 (N.Y. 1991).
153. The Code renders irrelevant evidence that contradicts memoranda exchanged
by contracting parties to confirm the terms of their agreement. U.C.C. § 2-202. The
formal requirements for such memoranda are minimal when exchanged between
merchants. The Code only requires that a confirmatory memoranda be "some writing
sufficient to indicate a contract for sale has been made." U.C.C. § 2-201(1), (2).
By contrast, under the parol evidence rule of the New York common law, a confirma-
tory memorandum must completely and accurately evince the parties agreement. Don-
ald Friedman & Co., Inc. v. Newmah, 174 N.E. 703, 704 (N.Y. 1931). Generally if the
memorandum does not state clearly that it is the full and final expression of the parties
agreement, parol evidence will be admitted to show the memorandum was mistaken.
Dubin v. Fashion Knitting Mills, 194 N.Y.S.2d 320, 322 (App. Term 1959). SeeJames M.
Cain, Does the Intershoe Case Fit All Swap Confirmations?, 10 INT'L FIN. L. REv. 39 (1991).
154. Indeed, the Code's rules probably do not close a transaction soon enough. See
infra notes 163-69 and accompanying text.
155. Compania Sud-Americana de Vapores, S.A., 785 F. Supp. at 431 n.19 (quoting Inter-
shoe, Inc., 571 N.E.2d at 644).
156. 961 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 188 (1992).
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Court of Appeals. In that case, a New York firm, engaged in currency
swaps with a Swiss Bank, wired nearly $6.9 million dollars to the Swiss
Bank's account in New York. 15 7 In return, the firm was to receive an
equivalent amount in foreign currency.' 58 The New York firm also trans-
ferred $4.1 million dollars worth of foreign currency to the Swiss bank and
was to receive dollars in return. 159 Swiss banking authorities, however,
closed the Swiss bank before it could transfer the dollar and foreign cur-
rency balances that represented its end of these swaps. 160 The banking
official charged with liquidating the Swiss bank sought to recover the
bank's balances held in New York, 1 1 but the New York firm also claimed
the balances.' 62
The Second Circuit applied Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code in reaching its decision. "In a currency exchange," the court rea-
soned, "money is not the medium of exchange, but rather the object of
exchange. Such currency thus constitutes 'goods' . . . subject to the
Code."163 The court consequently permitted the New York firm to
reclaim the $6.9 million balance it had wired to the Swiss bank's account
as a reclaiming seller.' 6 4 Under Article 2, a seller who has shipped goods
on credit to an insolvent buyer can recover the goods if the seller demands
their return within ten days.165 Nevertheless, the court did not permit
the New York firm to recover the foreign balances it had transferred1 66
because it considered the New York firm a "buyer" of dollars in this swap
and, therefore, held that the firm had no right to reclaim the $4.1 million.
However, the court did not explain what prevented the firm from
reclaiming the foreign currency it had exchanged as a "seller" in this trans-
action. Moreover, and far more troubling, the opinion shows no apprecia-
tion for the difficulties that the reclaiming seller rule presents for foreign
exchange.
As described above, most foreign exchange trades take place on the
spot market' 67 and have maturities of less than two days.' 6 8 Fully two-
thirds of the forward trades have maturities of less than a week. 169 In this
trading environment, the ten days that the Code allows a seller to reclaim
goods is an eternity. No judge would lightly allow a seller to reclaim real
estate that was the subject of a transaction made decades ago; too many
transfers made in reliance on apparent title would have occurred. In the
foreign exchange market, a similar number of trades made in reliance on
157. In re Koreag 961 F.2d at 345.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 355.
164. Id. at 356.
165. U.C.C. § 2-702(2) (1993).
166. In re Koreag, 961 F.2d at 357.
167. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
168. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
169. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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an earlier exchange can occur in just a few hours. The foreign exchange
market thus depends upon a rigorous finality.
The drafters of Article 4A recognized the importance of finality in
electronic funds transfers-the means chosen to settle most foreign
exchange transactions. Under Article 4A, a beneficiary of a funds transfer
is entitled to payment once the beneficiary's bank has accepted a payment
order.170 In In re Koreag, this occurred when the New York bank holding
the Swiss bank's account accepted the New York firm's transfers. 17 1 The
Koreag decision thus conflicts with Article 4 and with modem payments
law. The decision compares unfavorably with Equitable Trust Co. v.
Keene,172 decided seventy years earlier, in which the New York courts first
applied sales law to foreign exchange transactions. Unlike the Koreag
court, the judge in Keene carefully noted that the case did not involve a
negotiable instruments issue. 173 The conflict between Article 4A and In re
Koreag has led the Payments Sub-committee of the American Bar Associa-
tion's Uniform Commercial Code Committee to recommend that the Per-
manent Editorial Board issue a practice commentary stating that, in the
event of a conflict between Article 2 and 4A, Article 4A should control. 174
Ironically, In re Koreag went wrong where earlier decisions involving
the parol evidence rule went ostensibly right.175 Those decisions appear
to establish a principle favoring finality in the law of foreign exchange. 176
If these decisions had explicitly articulated such a rationale, they might
have provided guidance for the Koreag decision. Yet, neither these deci-
sions nor Koreag offer any reasons for applying the rules of Article 2 to
foreign exchange, nor do they evince any concern for commercial practice
in the foreign exchange markets. Instead, the decisions display a mechan-
ical kind of legal reasoning; everything in these decisions hinges on the
characterization issue, and nothing could be further from Llewellyn's
plans for the Code. For this reason, the cases offer some lessons to the
drafting committee engaged in the revision of Article 2.
MI. Suggestions For The Revision of Article 2
Article 2's scope provisions simply do not state clearly enough Llewellyn's
vision of how courts should approach the Code. As we have seen, Llewel-
lyn did not want the courts to feel unduly fettered by the language of the
Code. 177 If the Code stated a.rule or a definition that had become out-
170. U.C.C. § 4A 4-404(a) (1993).
171. In re Koreag, 961 F.2d at 345.
172. 183 N.Y.S. 699 (Sup. Ct. 1920), rev'd, 133 N.E. 894 (N.Y. 1922).
173. 133 N.E. at 894. See also Mezer v. Zimmerman, 194 N.Y.S. 222, 223 (Sup. Ct.
1922) (jury finds parties contracted for currency and not a bank balance transferred by
a draft).
174. THOMAS BAXTER & CATHY SCARBOROUGH, OUTLINE OF REPORT OF SUBCOMM1TTEE
ON PAYMENTS CONCERNING THE APPLICATION OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE TO A
FOREIGN EXcHANGE TRADE (2nd Discussion Draft 1993).
175. Intershoe, Inc. v. Banker's Trust Co., 571 N.E.2d 641 (N.Y. 1991).
176. See supra notes 152-55 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 128-36 and accompanying text.
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dated as a result of commercial developments, he wanted courts to disre-
gard the rule or definition. 178 For example, even though Article 2
expressly excludes investment securities transactions, he wanted courts to
feel free to apply the principles of Article 2 to such a transaction if it made
commercial sense.17 9 Similarly, he believed courts should not apply a
Code provision to a transaction if it was commercially unreasonable to do
so, even if the transaction lay within the express scope of the Code. 8 0
Above all, he wanted courts to articulate their reasons for applying or
refusing to apply the Code. He hoped these reasons would guide future
decisions, giving the Code consistency without undue inflexibility in the
manner of the common law.18 '
The language of Article 2's scope section does not direct the courts to
approach the Code in a common law manner. The scope language-
.unless the context otherwise requires, this Article applies to transactions
in goods"-was added to the Code in 1955 to address criticisms that the
Article should be expressly limited to sales of goods.182 To some extent,
the phrase "unless the context otherwise requires" permits a court to
expand or narrow the article's reach as Llewellyn had envisioned.' 83 As
the Study Group Report noted, however, the phrase is too ambiguous to
give courts much direction.' 84 Several Study Group members favor a
scope section similar to one proposed in 1982 for the Canadian Sale of
178. 1 KELLY, supra note 76, at 309 ("[T]he Draft seeks to make plain that when cir-
cumstances unmistakably and persistently show the obsolescence of a policy declared in
the Act, the Courts are free to move in the common-law manner toward cure.").
179. U.C.C. § 2-105 cmt. 1 (1993).
180. This approach is most clearly stated in the scope section of Article 5:
This Article deals with some but not all of the rules and concepts of letters of
credit as such rules or concepts have developed prior to this act or may hereaf-
ter develop. The fact that this Article states a rule does not by itself require,
imply or negate application of the same or a converse rule to a situation not
provided for or to a person not specified by this Article.
U.C.C. § 5-102(3) (1993).
181.
It is not where the words [of a Code provision] leave off, but where the reason
leaves off, that the provision is to find its limit. The borders need to be left
open for new cases of similar reason, as yet unimagined.
The Draft [of the Sales Act] proceeds upon the proposition thjt if the reason
in life of a situation be clearly grasped and stated, and the reason of its solution
be made clear to the courts, there results both immediately and over the long
haul a more reckonable course of decision and a more reckonable body of
interpretation than can be had by any other statutory device which is not to be
overhauled and rebuilt every two years or five.
1 KELLY, supra note 76, at 306-07 (emphasis in original); see also id. at 309 ("[T] he Court
may either develop or limit the principles laid down in the Act ... in the common law
manner.").
182. See SUPPLEMENT No. 1 TO THE 1952 OFFICIAL DRAFr OF TEXT AND COMMENTS OF
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, reprinted in 17 ELIzABETH S. KELLY, UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE DRAFTS 355-56 (1984); 1 STATE OF NEw YORK LAw REVISION COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 147, at 355-56.
183. See 1 STATE OF NEwYoRK LAws REVISION COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 147, at
723 (statement of Prof. Pasley).
184. STUDY GROUP REPORT, supra note 1, at 40.
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Goods Act.185 The Canadian proposal would strictly limit the Article's
reach to sales of goods but would permit a court to apply any provision of
the Article to other transactions "if relevant in principle and appropriate
in the circumstances."' 86 This approach would require a court faced with
a transaction other than the outright sale of hard goods to state its reasons
for extending the reach of the Code, thus allowing the opinion to guide
future decisions. Had the parol evidence decisions on foreign exchange
articulated a principle favoring finality, the In re Koreag court would have
been forced to consider this principle in its decision. This approach is
better than the existing Code language, but the revision should, as much
as possible, avoid hinging a question about the Article's scope on charac-
terization questions. The question should not be whether the transaction
involves goods, services, choses in action, money, or commodities, but
whether the rules of the article make sense under the circumstances.
The drafting committee might also wish to consider what does not
belong in a revised Article 2. This approach was adopted in Article 9 of
the Code, which has a general scope section but also contains a list of
specific exclusions.' 8 7 The drafting committee would be wise to include
foreign exchange in an Article 2 exclusion list. Foreign exchange is inter-
national in a way the sale of goods is not; it should not be regulated with
state law like the Code.
Other existing bodies of law already regulate foreign exchange activi-
ties,18 8 and adding Article 2 to the mix will likely cause some peculiarities.
No one would suggest that Article 2, for example, should apply to trades
on the floor of the Chicago Commodities Exchange. A currency .futures
contract purchased on the exchange, however, is in many respects func-
tionally equivalent to a forward contract for hedging financial risk. If a
forward contract is subject to Article 2 but a futures exchange is not, a
great deal hinges on what is purely a matter of form. This approach, remi-
niscent of Williston, was rejected by Llewellyn and other drafters of the
Code.
Moreover, the Code's rules of form appear inordinately outdated
when applied to foreign exchange transactions. The statutes of frauds set
forth in Articles One' 89 and Two' 90 require signed writings for agree-
ments to be enforceable. While the Code defines the term "writings"
rather broadly,' 9 1 the term does not seem to encompass an audio tape of a
185. Id. at 42 n.9. Although this proposal was first made in 1982, it has never been
enacted. Id.
186. Id.
187. U.C.C. § 9-104 (1993).
188. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. pt. 128 (1993) (reporting requirements); 12 C.F.R. pt. 208,
app. A (1993) (risk-based capital adequacy guidelines for member banks of the Federal
Reserve System); 12 C.F.R. pt. 225, app. A (1993) (guidelines for bank holding compa-
nies); 12 C.F.R. § 3 (1993) (guidelines for national banks); 12 C.F.R. § 567 (1993)
(guidelines for thrifts); 12 C.F.R. § 325 (guidelines for federally insured, state-chartered
banks); 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-24 (1993) (future and options regulation).
189. U.C.C. § 1-206 (1993).
190. U.C.C. § 2-201 (1993).
191. U.C.C. § 1-201 (46) (1993) ("any ... intentional reduction to tangible form.")
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bargain reached by telephone or a record of a transaction reached over a
modem 19 2 because the Code requires the writing to be "signed."1 93 A
party to a foreign exchange transaction can avoid a statute of frauds prob-
lem to some degree by sending a confirmatory memorandum to a
counter-party, 194 but even this device is ill-suited to foreign exchange as it
is practiced today. As we have seen, most foreign exchange is conducted
by professional traders who make their bargains by telephone or increas-
ingly over linked computer screens. Seconds after concluding a transac-
tion they enter into another in reliance on their position. Even a
confirmatory memorandum secured the next day may come too late-yet
the Code allows ten days. 195 For these reasons, the New York State Bar
Association Committee on Banking Law has recommended legislation that
would relieve the uncertainty that the Code's statutes of frauds create for
foreign exchange agreements by permitting parties to enter into enforcea-
ble contracts over the telephone, by computer, or through other means of
electronic communication.1 9 6
Finally, if the revision leaves the definition of goods unchanged, a
new article should, at a minimum, resolve issues related to the settlement
of a foreign exchange transaction under the payments articles: Articles 3,
4 and particularly 4A. Article 2 remedies like the reclaiming seller rule
have the potential seriously to undermine finality of payment, an impor-
tant principle in all modem payment systems, and particularly in elec-
tronic funds transfers.
192. See, e.g., Roos v. Aloi, 487 N.Y.S.2d 637, 642-43 (Sup. Ct. 1985) (tape recording
does not satisfy the U.C.C statute of frauds).
193. The Code defines the term "signed" to require a party to affix a signature or
other symbol with a "present intention to authenticate a writing." U.C.C. § 1-201 (39)
(1993).
194. U.C.C. § 2-201(2) (1993).
195. Id. Ironically, most foreign exchange trades would fare better under the origi-
nal Statute of Frauds of 1677, which exempted agreements to be performed within a
year.
196. See Denis M. Forster ed., Memorandum in Support of Legislation, in SwAvs AND
OTHER DERIVATIVES IN 1993, supra note 39, at 97.
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